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FRANKLY, MY DEAR AMERICA, WE DON’T 
GIVE A DAMN: COMPARING CHINESE AND 
EUROPEAN TRADE BARRIERS TO 
AMERICAN AUDIOVISUAL WORKS AND 
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE 
Shalia Sakona* 
Abstract: For Hollywood film studios, strict Chinese regulations control-
ling the importation and distribution of foreign audiovisual works within 
China have made the Chinese audiovisual market as impenetrable as the 
Great Wall. Recently, in China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) ordered China to relax its barriers to 
foreign films. China has yet to comply with the order, causing ongoing 
protest by the United States. Meanwhile, the United States has long toler-
ated Television Without Frontiers, a European Union (EU) Directive that 
imposes local content quotas that restrict the amount of non-European 
programming aired on television. This Note compares the Chinese regu-
lations with the EU Directive, and the corresponding American re-
sponses. It theorizes that the U.S. position against Television Without 
Frontiers has been strengthened by China—Measures Affecting Trading 
Rights, and that the United States should take a uniformly aggressive 
stance against foreign barriers to audiovisual trade to protect Hollywood’s 
interests abroad. 
Introduction 
 China began 2012, the year of the Dragon,1 with a fiery blow to 
the nation’s television programming.2 In February 2012, the Chinese 
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) an-
nounced a new set of regulations which prohibits the showing of im-
ported programs during prime time and requires channels to fill at 
 
* Shalia Sakona is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 See Gary Du et al., Flushing Parade Celebrates Chinese New Year, Epoch Times (Feb. 6, 
2012), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-states/flushing-parade-celebrates-chinese- 
new-year-187231.html. 
2 See Andrew Jacobs, Aiming at Its Asian TV Competitors, China Limits Foreign-Made Pro-
grams, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2012, at A11. 
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least seventy-five percent of their total airtime with Chinese program-
ming.3 The regulations send a message to Western television produc-
ers: in China, there is no business for show business.4 
                                                                                                                     
 Hollywood producers are, however, no strangers to burdensome 
regulations restricting the importation and distribution of audiovisual 
products within China.5 In 2007, the United States brought a complaint 
before the World Trade Organization (WTO) against China for its dis-
criminatory importation and distribution structure for foreign films.6 
Chinese regulations not only deprive American enterprises of the abil-
ity to compete for box office revenues, they also prompt widespread 
piracy of American works throughout China, costing the American film 
industry billions of dollars each year.7 In 2009, in China—Measures Af-
fecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China—Measures Affecting Trading 
Rights), the WTO Panel and Appellate Body found in part that China’s 
current distribution system, which allows only authorized distributors to 
import films into China for theatrical release and distribution, violates 
China’s trade obligations under the Chinese Accession Protocol and 
Accession Working Party Report.8 The WTO gave China two years to 
restructure its distribution system, a deadline China ultimately failed to 
meet.9 Though they restrict TV programming rather than feature films, 
the new SARFT regulations indicate the Chinese government’s contin-
ued hostility toward foreign audiovisual works and its unwillingness to 
liberalize trade in these markets.10 
 In contemplating how to proceed in the face of China’s non-
compliance with the WTO ruling, America should also consider why it 
 
3 Id. These regulations come on the heels of another recent SARFT directive limiting 
the number of entertainment programs each satellite channel is allowed to air “each week 
to two,” which came into effect January 1, 2012. See CNN Wire Staff, China Sees Culture as a 
Crucial Battleground, CNN ( Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/05/world/asia/ 
china-western-culture/index.html. 
4 See Jacobs, supra note 2; CNN Wire Staff, supra note 3 (explaining the recent crack-
downs on entertainment programming within China and predicting that the Chinese me-
dia scene will become increasingly restrictive of foreign media). 
5 See Shujen Wang, Framing Piracy: Globalization and Film Distribution in 
Greater China 61–64 (2003). 
6 Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Ser-
vices for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 4, WT/DS363/AB/R 
(Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report]. 
7 See David Pierson, China Still Restricting Foreign Media, U.S. Complains, L.A. Times, Mar. 
22, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/22/business/la-fi-china-wto-20110322. 
8 Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, ¶¶ 161, 200. 
9 See Pierson, supra note 7. 
10 See CNN Wire Staff, supra note 3; Pierson, supra note 7. 
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has not aggressively challenged similar economic restrictions in place in 
other countries.11 Over the past century, various countries have erected 
trade barriers against American film and television programming in the 
forms of national subsidies and local content quotas.12 Most notably, 
the European Union (EU) enacted Television Without Frontiers, a Di-
rective requiring all member states to reserve a majority of their TV air-
time for works produced in Europe (the local content requirement).13 
Although several compelling arguments have indicated that the Euro-
pean treatment of American film and TV programming violates various 
WTO agreements, the United States has not followed through with 
formal action against the EU.14 
 The purpose of this Note is to explore the distinctions between the 
Chinese and European treatment of American audiovisual works that 
have prompted the United States to take an aggressive stance against 
the former but not the latter. Part I begins with a brief discussion of the 
significance of the American audiovisual industry. It also describes the 
relevant trade restrictions in place in China and the EU and the eco-
nomic impact of these restrictions upon the American film and televi-
sion industries. Part II outlines the United States’ legal arguments 
against both the Chinese and European restrictions and discusses the 
2009 WTO ruling condemning China’s treatment of films imported for 
theatrical release. Part III analyzes the legal, cultural, economic, and 
philosophical differences underlying Chinese and European impedi-
ments to American audiovisual works. Part III suggests that the United 
States has an equally compelling WTO case against the EU and has only 
failed to fully pursue such a case out of a sense of pragmatism. It fur-
ther suggests that if the United States wants to maintain its place as the 
world’s leading provider of audiovisual entertainment and to preserve 
the integrity of the free trade agreements to which it is a party, it should 
take a uniformly aggressive legal stance against foreign barriers to au-
diovisual trade.15 
                                                                                                                      
11 See John David Donaldson, “Television Without Frontiers”: The Continuing Tension Between 
Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity, 20 Fordham Int’l L.J. 90, 111 (1996). 
12 See Michael Curtin, Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience: The Global-
ization of Chinese Film and TV 19 (2007). 
13 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 92, 99. 
14 See id. at 110–11. 
15 See W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and Cultural Pro-
tectionism, 20 Yale J. Int’l L. 105, 147 (1995). 
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I. Background 
A. The Dominance of the U.S. Audiovisual Entertainment  
Industry and the World’s Response 
 The United States has been the world’s leading producer of films 
and television programming since World War I, when war ravaged Eu-
ropean production capabilities.16 Today, film and television comprise a 
significant portion of the U.S. entertainment industry, an industry which 
represents the United States’ second-largest trade surplus and accounts 
for over five percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.17 Foreign reve-
nues from sales of American entertainment products abroad constitute 
roughly half of the industry’s overall profits.18 Hollywood studios rely 
upon foreign markets for roughly seventy percent of their total box of-
fice sales.19 
 The United States’ role as a leading producer of film and televi-
sion enables it to produce audiovisual works of a higher budget and 
caliber than most of its foreign counterparts.20 Hollywood capitalizes 
on its large profits within the United States by reselling its products to 
foreign theaters and broadcasters for a fraction of the cost of produc-
tion.21 Consequently, other countries struggle to create competitive 
audiovisual works, and in many regions, American films and television 
programming make up the majority of audiovisual entertainment avail-
able for consumption.22 Because of this competitive imbalance, many 
countries have enacted protectionist measures like subsidies for local 
producers, restrictions on importing foreign audiovisual works, and 
local content restrictions requiring that certain percentages of films 
and TV programs aired be domestically produced.23 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 94–95. 
17 Claire Wright, Hollywood’s Disappearing Act: International Trade Remedies to Bring Holly-
wood Home, 39 Akron L. Rev. 739, 747 (2006); Memorandum from Ken Bhattacharjee & 
Toby Mendel, Article19 Legal Programme, Local Content Rules in Broadcasting (Mar. 2001), 
available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/local-content-rules.pdf 
[hereinafter Article19 Memo]. 
18 See Wright, supra note 17, at 747. 
19 See Richard Verrier et al., Warner Bros. to Distribute Films in China on Cable TV, L.A. 
Times, June 16, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/16/business/la-fi-ct-china-
warner-20110616. 
20 See Shao, supra note 15, at 121–22; Article19 Memo, supra note 17. 
21 See Shao, supra note 15, at 121–22; Article19 Memo, supra note 17. 
22 See Shao, supra note 15, at 116; Article19 Memo, supra note 17. 
23 See Curtin, supra note 12, at 19; Shao, supra note 15, at 118–19. 
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 Policymakers in such countries rely upon two principal arguments 
to justify trade barriers in this area.24 First, they argue that domestic 
producers must be given preferential treatment at home to counteract 
Hollywood’s sizeable competitive advantage in foreign markets.25 Sec-
ond, they claim that their markets must be protected from a deluge of 
American audiovisual works because the dominance and omnipresence 
of Hollywood dilutes and overshadows their own national and cultural 
identities.26 Former French President François Mitterrand framed the 
issue in the following manner: “What is at stake, and therefore in peril 
. . . is the right of each country to forge its imagination and to transmit 
to future generations the representation of its own identity.”27 
B. China’s Barriers to Foreign Films and the Impact on the American 
Audiovisual Industry 
 As the most heavily populated country in the world,28 China also 
has the potential to be the world’s greatest audience.29 Over one billion 
Chinese citizens watch TV and more than two hundred million attend 
movie theaters.30 In 2010, China’s box office revenues were approxi-
mately $1.5 billion, the sixth highest in the world.31 This value repre-
sents a sixty-four percent increase from the previous year, and movie 
attendance in China is expected to continue to climb.32 The China 
Film Producers’ Association predicts that by 2015, as many as seven 
thousand new movie theaters will be built in China, and that the nation 
will enjoy box office revenues of about $5.74 billion.33 Accordingly, un-
fettered participation in the Chinese audiovisual market would secure 
large profits for Hollywood.34 
                                                                                                                      
24 See Shao, supra note 15, at 125–26. 
25 See id. at 131. 
26 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 148–49; Shao, supra note 15, at 125, 137–38. 
27 Mitterrand Denounces U.S. Domination at Francophone Summit, Agence Fr. Presse, Oct. 
16, 1993, available at WestlawNext (follow “News” hyperlink; then search “(Mitterrand & 
Denounces) & DA(10–16–1993)”; then select the first result). 
28 The World Factbook: Country Comparison: Population, Cent. Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html 
(last visited May 14, 2013). 
29 See Curtin, supra note 12, at 1. 
30 Id. 
31 Pierson, supra note 7. 
32 Id.; see Ellen E. Jones, Can Hollywood Serve China’s One Billion Film-Goers?, Guardian 
(London), June 9, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2011/jun/09/china-hollywood-
film-industry. 
33 Jones, supra note 32. 
34 See Wang, supra note 5, at 64; Jones, supra note 32. 
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 China, however, has always been resistant to the influx of foreign 
audiovisual works.35 Chinese law prohibits foreign-owned-and-invested 
enterprises from importing films for theatrical release or home distribu-
tion.36 SARFT designates the domestic enterprises that are permitted to 
import foreign films and has granted only two enterprises such author-
ity: the China Film Group Corporation (previously called the China 
Film Import and Export Corporation), and the Huaxia Film Distribu-
tion Company, both of which are state-owned.37 Additionally, SARFT 
only allows twenty foreign films to be played in Chinese movie theaters 
each year, subject to harsh revenue-sharing arrangements.38 Under 
these revenue-sharing arrangements, foreign producers typically receive 
only thirteen to eighteen percent of the ticket revenues their movies 
earn in China, in comparison to the fifty percent these producers would 
receive in the United States.39 The remaining eighty-two to eighty-seven 
percent of revenues is split between the Chinese import/export distri-
bution office and local film companies.40 For example, in 2011, Para-
mount Pictures’ Transformers 3 grossed $159 million at Chinese box of-
fices, of which Paramount received only $30 million.41 Foreign films are 
increasingly excluded from Chinese theaters during peak viewing peri-
ods in order to prompt patronage of Chinese-made films.42 
 Strict import controls circumvent Hollywood’s vast distribution 
network and severely undermine its ability to get its products to Chi-
nese viewers.43 Some major Hollywood studios have managed to cir-
cumvent import restrictions and reap greater shares of movie profits by 
forming joint ventures and co-producing movies with Chinese compa-
nies.44 In this manner, Dreamworks Animation will reap fifty percent of 
the profits from Kung Fu Panda 3, a co-production between the Ameri-
                                                                                                                      
35 See Wang, supra note 5, at 61. 
36 Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, ¶ 161. 
37 See id. ¶¶ 4, 161; Pierson, supra note 7; Movie Sector Undergoes Constant Changes, China 
Daily (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/18/content_ 
392455.htm. 
38 See Wang, supra note 5, at 63. 
39 Id.; Paula M. Miller, Reeling in China’s Movie Fans, China Bus. Rev. (2007), available 
at http://www.chollywood.org/en/news/reeling-in-chinas-movie-fans.html. 
40 See Wang, supra note 5, at 63. 
41 Ben Fritz & John Horn, Reel China: U.S. Film Producers Are Engaging the Chinese, L.A. 
Times, Aug. 24, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/aug/24/entertainment/la-
et-china-film-quota-20110824. 
42 See Miller, supra note 39. 
43 See Wang, supra note 5, at 64; Miller, supra note 39. 
44 Fritz & Horn, supra note 41. 
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can company and three of China’s largest media companies.45 Such 
arrangements, however, subject American studios to unpredictable and 
overbearing foreign investment laws, and equally unpredictable and 
overbearing censorship by the Chinese government.46 
 In addition to diminishing Hollywood studios’ autonomy and box 
office revenues, the Chinese restrictions have also contributed to mas-
sive piracy and bootlegging throughout China.47 Chinese viewers gravi-
tate toward American films, which surpass Chinese films in terms of 
production values and special effects.48 Thus, when denied legitimate 
and timely access to American audiovisual works, Chinese viewers seek 
illegal bootlegs on the internet and the black market.49 The delays that 
even the SARFT-approved American films encounter before making 
their way onto Chinese screens give bootleggers a head start to obtain 
and sell illegal copies of the same films, thereby decreasing box office 
sales.50 In 2010 alone, China’s bootleg DVD industry made an esti-
mated six billion dollars in profits, a figure that roughly quadrupled 
Chinese box office revenues during the same period.51 Bootlegs made 
in China find their way into the hands of other global consumers, 
weakening demand for U.S. audiovisual works in the broader interna-
tional community.52 
 While China’s restrictions on foreign audiovisual products are mo-
tivated in part by the nation’s desire to make the Chinese film industry 
more competitive,53 the government also uses these restrictions to con-
trol Chinese citizens’ access to Western ideas and culture.54 Chinese 
officials believe that Western audiovisual works are damaging to the 
                                                                                                                      
45 Richard Verrier, DreamWorks Animation’s ‘Kung Fu Panda 3’ to Be China Co-Production, 
L.A. Times, Aug. 6, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/06/entertainment/la-et-
ct-dreamworks-china-kung-fu-panda-3-20120806. 
46 See Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 Colum. J. Asian L. 1, 21–23, 47 
(2006); Fritz & Horn, supra note 41. 
47 See Miller, supra note 39; Dan Levin & John Horn, DVD Pirates Running Rampant in Chi-
na, L.A. Times, Mar. 22, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/22/entertainment/ 
la-et-china-piracy-20110322; Pierson, supra note 7. 
48 See Curtin, supra note 12, at 75. As one Chinese film critic noted, “[t]raditional 
Chinese values are mainly non-confrontational and do not make good movies.” Jones, 
supra note 32. 
49 See Miller, supra note 39; Levin & Horn, supra note 47; Pierson, supra note 7. 
50 See Miller, supra note 39. 
51 Pierson, supra note 7. 
52 See Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Trade Barriers to Exports of U.S. 
Filmed Entertainment 11–12 (2010), available at http://www.mpaa.org/resources/ 
69721865-ac82-4dc4-88ec-01ee84c651a1.pdf; Wang, supra note 5, at 47. 
53 See Wang, supra note 5, at 66. 
54 See id. at 61; CNN Wire Staff, supra note 3. 
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Chinese conscience and could prompt a popular revolt against socialist 
ideology, and ultimately the Chinese government itself.55 Because of 
these fears, the Chinese government strives to eradicate Western influ-
ence in the form of foreign audiovisual works despite China’s trade ob-
ligations under the WTO framework.56 
C. Europe’s Barriers to Non-European Television and Their Impact on the 
American Entertainment Industry 
 Before Hollywood’s rise to prominence in the 1920s, Europe was 
the world’s leader in film production.57 Today, many European na-
tions—most notably, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy— 
remain competitive in the global entertainment industry.58 In their ef-
forts to sustain and increase the viability of European cinematography, 
individual European nations and the community at large have created 
subsidies for local producers.59 In the United Kingdom, for example, 
the state-financed British Screen Finance agency loans production funds 
to about a quarter of all British films.60 In France, the French National 
Center for Cinematography provides direct funding and tax concessions 
to producers on a points-based system that allocates points for the use of 
French language and—to a lesser extent—European production firms, 
subject matter, talent, filming locations, etc.61 These French subsidies 
are funded in part by a tax on ticket sales at French cinemas, where 
most of the revenues are earned by American films.62 Additionally, co-
production treaties and subsidiary bodies like Eurimages and the Euro-
pean Convention on Cinematographic Co-Production allocate funding 
for films that are co-produced by multiple EU member states or reflect 
the European identity.63 In order to obtain the benefits of local subsi-
dies like those in place throughout the EU, American studios increas-
                                                                                                                      
55 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 149; CNN Wire Staff, supra note 3; Louisa Lim, China 
Targets Entertainment TV in Cultural Purge, NPR ( Jan. 11, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr. 
org/2012/01/11/144994861/china-targets-entertainment-tv-in-cultural-purge. 
56 See Wang, supra note 5, at 42; CNN Wire Staff, supra note 3. 
57 Donaldson, supra note 11, at 94. 
58 See Shao, supra note 15, at 116. 
59 See Carolyn Hyun-Kyung Kim, Building the Korean Film Industry’s Competitiveness: Abol-
ish the Screen Quota and Subsidize the Film Industry, 9 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 353, 369–71 
(2000). 
60 See David H. Horowitz & Peter J. Davey, Financing American Films at Home and Abroad, 
20 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 461, 482–83 (1996); Kim, supra note 59, at 371. 
61 See Horowitz & Davey, supra note 60, at 483. 
62 See id. 
63 See Kim, supra note 59, at 369–70. 
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ingly choose to shoot and produce their films and TV programs 
abroad.64 
 Despite the various forms of national and regional assistance avail-
able to local audiovisual producers, Hollywood remains the dominant 
player at European box offices.65 With over seventy percent of Europe’s 
box office revenues deriving from tickets to American films, Hollywood 
continues to enjoy considerable success with European moviegoers.66 
Accordingly, television programming, rather than film importation and 
distribution, is Hollywood’s major battleground in Europe.67 
 In 1989, the European Economic Community (succeeded by the 
EU) limited consumption of American TV programming within Eu-
rope through the issuance of the Television Without Frontiers Direc-
tive.68 The Directive requires that, “where practicable,” the majority of 
each member state’s TV airtime must be occupied by European69 pro-
gramming.70 This requirement burdens smaller states with unsophisti-
cated production capabilities.71 Rather than cheaply accessing high-
quality American programming, these states must pay higher prices for 
less-desirable European programming.72 The Directive threatens the 
viability of high-budget U.S. programming, which has come to rely 
upon resale in the European market to recoup its costs.73 When Televi-
sion Without Frontiers entered into force, the sale of American pro-
gramming to European broadcasters earned Hollywood annual profits 
of over one billion dollars.74 A decade later, this figure had risen to two 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Horowitz & Davey, supra note 60, at 461; Kim, supra note 59, at 369; Wright, supra 
note 17, at 739–40. 
65 See Gordon H. Hanson & Chong Xiang, International Trade in Motion Picture Services, 
in International Trade in Services and Intangibles in the Era of Globalization 
203, 204 (Marshall Reinsdorf & Matthew J. Slaughter eds., 2009); Daniel Singer, GATT & 
The Shape of Our Dreams, Nation ( Jan. 17, 1994), available at http://www.thenation.com/ 
article/gatt-shape-our-dreams. 
66 See Hanson & Xiang, supra note 65, at 203–04; Singer, supra note 65. 
67 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 93, 95; Singer, supra note 65. 
68 Donaldson, supra note 11, at 92. 
69 See Council Directive 89/552, of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain 
Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Con-
cerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, art. 6, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 (EC) 
(classifying works as “European” based on the production company’s nationality as well as 
the personnel involved); Donaldson, supra note 11, at 152. 
70 Council Directive 89/552, supra note 69, art. 4. 
71 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 98–99, 117–19. 
72 See id.; Kirsten L. Kessler, Protecting Free Trade in Audiovisual Entertainment: A Proposal 
for Counteracting the European Union’s Trade Barriers to the U.S. Entertainment Industry’s Exports, 
26 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 563, 565–66 (1995). 
73 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 120; Kessler, supra note 72, at 566. 
74 Donaldson, supra note 11, at 95. 
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billion dollars.75 Given rising inflation and a rapidly growing European 
TV market, Hollywood’s profits would have likely been even greater 
without the Directive’s limitations on non-European programming.76 
Because of these restrictions, TV providers within the EU have can-
celled lucrative contracts with American producers to avoid enforce-
ment actions.77 Europe has also recently experienced a proliferation of 
new TV stations.78 Historically, new TV stations have been prime con-
sumers of U.S. programming because of its relatively low cost.79 In or-
der to comply with Television Without Frontiers and avoid state and 
community sanctions, however, new stations are constrained from pur-
chasing more than forty-nine percent of their programming from U.S. 
producers.80 
 EU policymakers cite cultural concerns in defense of Television 
Without Frontiers’ discriminatory treatment of U.S. programming.81 
Member states argue that their unique cultural identities are threat-
ened when their markets are inundated with American television.82 
Consequently, EU policymakers seek to use television as a tool of cul-
tural advancement and preservation.83 
II. Discussion 
 The Chinese and European treatment of foreign film and television 
implicates China’s and Europe’s obligations as members of the WTO.84 
Formed in 1995, the WTO liberalizes international trade through the 
removal of state barriers to foreign goods and services.85 The WTO fa-
cilitates uniform trade terms between member nations through a system 
of bilateral and multilateral treaties.86 The EU has been member of the 
                                                                                                                      
75 Toby Miller, Anti-Americanism and Popular Culture 15 (Ctr. for Policy Studies, Anti-
Americanism Working Paper, 2005), available at http://cps.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/ 
publications/cps-working-paper-antiamericanism-and-popular-culture-2005.pdf. 
76 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 95, 117; Kessler, supra note 72, at 564–65. 
77 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 117–18. 
78 See id. at 118; Kessler, supra note 72, at 564–65. 
79 Donaldson, supra note 11, at 118. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. at 145, 169. 
82 See id. at 146–47; Jon Filipek, “Culture Quotas”: The Trade Controversy over the European 
Community’s Broadcasting Directive, 28 Stan. J. Int’l L. 323, 351 (1992). 
83 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 143–44; Kessler, supra note 72, at 567. 
84 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, ¶ 200; Wang, supra note 5, at 42; Don-
aldson, supra note 11, at 169. 
85 See What Is the World Trade Organization?, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited May 14, 2013). 
86 See Wang, supra note 5, at 43; What Is the World Trade Organization?, supra note 85. 
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WTO since the organization’s inception.87 All twenty-seven EU mem-
bers are also WTO members with rights and obligations independent of 
the EU as a whole.88 After fifteen years of contentious negotiations, 
China finally joined the WTO in 2001.89 
                                                                                                                     
A. Accession and Dispute Settlement Under the WTO 
 The process of joining the WTO varies for each state.90 An acced-
ing state is bound by the terms set forth in general rules like the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which are binding upon 
all members.91 Additionally, as part of the accession process, the acced-
ing state must often make specific commitments above and beyond its 
general WTO obligations, sometimes referred to as “WTO-plus obliga-
tions.”92 The acceding state negotiates its WTO-plus obligations with a 
working party comprised of interested members until all members are 
satisfied and consent to the accession.93 At this point, the acceding 
state’s WTO-plus obligations, as well as its consent to be bound by gen-
eral WTO provisions, are codified in its accession package, consisting of 
the accession protocol and working party report.94 The accession pack-
age addresses trade barriers in place in the acceding state which offend 
current WTO members.95 These barriers must be lowered to appease 
existing member states.96 Upon approval by the WTO General Council 
and subsequent ratification by the acceding state, the accession pack-
age enters into effect and the acceding state becomes a full-fledged 
member of the WTO.97 
 
87 The European Union and the WTO, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (last visited May 14, 2013). 
88 See id. 
89 China Officially Joins WTO, CNN (Nov. 11, 2001, 1:17 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/10/china.WTO/index.html. 
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english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm (last visited May 14, 2013). 
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 The WTO has in place a multilateral system of dispute settlement 
to encourage compliance with its requirements.98 If a member feels 
another member is violating either general rules or specific market ac-
cess obligations under its accession protocol, the injured member can 
invoke the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to halt the offending 
practice.99 The dispute settlement process works as follows: First, the 
injured party must consult the offending party to try to independently 
resolve the dispute.100 If the two parties are unable to reach a solution, 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body appoints a Panel at the request of 
the injured party.101 This Panel receives arguments from both sides and 
rules upon the legitimacy of the practice in question.102 The Panel is-
sues a report containing its ruling and, where applicable, a recommen-
dation on how the losing party may bring its practices into compliance 
with its WTO obligations.103 Next, either party may appeal on the 
points of law set forth in the Panel Report.104 If the respondent is un-
successful upon appeal or chooses not to appeal the Panel ruling, the 
respondent is given a reasonable period to comply with the ruling.105 If 
the respondent fails to bring its offending practice into conformity with 
its WTO obligations during that period, the winning party can impose 
reciprocal sanctions with the permission of the Dispute Settlement 
Body.106 
B.
against foreign goods exemplified by the “beggar-thy-neighbor” trade 
                                                                                                                     
The U.S. Argument Against Television Without Frontiers Under GATT 
 GATT was established in 1947, and in 1995 was subsumed under 
the WTO framework such that all WTO members are bound by GATT’s 
provisions.107 GATT’s creators sought to reduce states’ discrimination 
 
98 See A Unique Contribution, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/the 
wto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited May 14, 2013). 
99 See id. 
100 See The Process—Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, World Trade Org., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s2p1_e.htm (last 
visited May 14, 2013). 
101 A Unique Contribution, supra note 98. 
102 Id. 
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107 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994, World 
Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (last visited May 14, 
2013). 
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policies in place around the world throughout the preceding dec-
ades.108 By breaking down trade barriers that would otherwise impede 
the free flow of goods, GATT fosters the efficient allocation of global 
resources and eases global tensions which often arise from discrimina-
tory economic policies.109 
                                                                                                                     
 Opponents of Television Without Frontiers argue that the local 
content requirement imposed on European TV providers violates at 
least two central provisions of GATT: most favored nation (MFN) treat-
ment and national treatment.110 
1. Most Favored Nation Treatment 
 Contained in Article I(1) of GATT, the MFN provision requires 
that, if a contracting party gives another nation’s goods preferential 
treatment over other foreign goods, it must extend the same benefit to 
the goods of all contracting parties.111 That is, a contracting party must 
place all other contracting parties on the same economic playing field 
within its borders as its “most favored nation.”112 In negotiations, the 
United States has argued that Television Without Frontiers’ local con-
tent requirement violates MFN because it gives European program-
ming a trade advantage without extending the same advantage to other 
contracting parties.113 The Directive forces EU members to favor other 
European states over non-European states.114 For example, barring 
domestic regulations to the contrary, a Danish station could choose to 
fill its entire airtime with French (or Spanish, or Italian, or any other 
individual European state’s) programming.115 On the other hand, the 
same station could only fill up to forty-nine percent of its airtime with 
 
108 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 106–08. The term “beggar-thy-neighbor” is used in 
economics to describe the phenomenon of a country striving to better its own economic 
position through the imposition of burdensome tariffs, import quotas, etc., on its trading 
partners. Scott Minerd, The Return of “Beggar Thy Neighbor,” Guggenheim Partners ( June 
1, 2010), http://guggenheimpartners.com/Perspectives/Media/The-Return-of-Beggar-
Thy-Neighbor. Tolerance of “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies creates a type of prisoner’s 
dilemma in which each state has an incentive to implement trade barriers which results in 
a universally inefficient allocation of goods that makes everyone, even the imposing state, 
worse off. See id. 
109 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 107–08. 
110 See id. at 110. 
111 See GATT art. I(1). 
112 See id.; Donaldson, supra note 11, at 112. 
113 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 113. 
114 See id. 
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U.S. programming.116 In this scenario, France enjoys the benefit of be-
ing Denmark’s MFN because it faces no quantitative restrictions in this 
area, while the United States suffers discriminatory treatment.117 
2. National Treatment 
 Contained in Article III of GATT, the national treatment provision 
dictates that once the foreign goods of a contracting party legally cross 
the border of the relevant state, they must be treated in the same man-
ner as domestic goods.118 GATT contracting parties are not allowed to 
impose quotas that favor domestic goods over comparable foreign 
goods that have legally crossed the border.119 The United States argues 
that Television Without Frontiers encourages community members to 
deny national treatment to U.S. programming.120 Each European state 
faces no quantitative restrictions in this area—a European station could 
comply with Television Without Frontiers by filling all of its airtime with 
domestic programming.121 On the other hand, if a station had already 
met its maximum allowance for foreign programming, it would be 
barred from airing any additional U.S. programming.122 Consequently, 
U.S. programming is denied the preferential treatment enjoyed by na-
tional programming.123 
3. U.S. Action Against Television Without Frontiers Under GATT 
 Shortly after Television Without Frontiers’ passage, the United 
States issued a formal complaint with the ruling council of GATT on 
the issue of the local content requirement and requested bilateral con-
sultations with the EU.124 When the EU adamantly maintained that Tel-
evision Without Frontiers was compatible with its GATT obligations, the 
bilateral consultations between the two parties broke down.125 The 
United States could have subsequently triggered the next phase in the 
WTO dispute settlement process by requesting the appointment of a 
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Panel.126 Instead, it has allowed its complaint to lie dormant for 
years,127 and Television Without Frontiers’ local content requirement 
remains in full force.128 
                                                                                                                     
C. The WTO Proceedings Between the United States and China over China’s 
Barriers to Audiovisual Trade 
 While television programming is not specifically exempted from 
contracting parties’ GATT obligations, cinematographic works (films) 
are granted special consideration.129 Whereas television stations have 
historically been state-owned or heavily regulated, movie theaters have 
traditionally been private, profit-driven enterprises.130 Thus, contract-
ing parties recognized that local cinema may need special protection to 
avoid being driven out of the market by the films from countries with 
stronger entertainment industries.131 Article IV of GATT sets forth the 
cinema exception which allows states to dedicate a fixed proportion of 
national screen time to domestically produced works.132 The exception 
contains no ceiling, so a contracting party could technically reserve all 
of its national screen time for domestic works.133 When China acceded 
to the WTO, it agreed to raise its limit on the number of foreign films 
that could be imported each year from ten to twenty.134 Accordingly, 
though the meager foreign film quota remains a major point of con-
tention for Hollywood, the quota was not part of the United States’ 
WTO proceedings and was not addressed by the Panel.135 
1. China’s Obligations to Liberalize Audiovisual Trade Under the Chinese 
Accession Package 
 China’s accession to the WTO was much more complicated than a 
typical accession.136 China’s economic strength, socialist underpinnings, 
 
126 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 110–11. 
127 See id. at 111. 
128 See Television Broadcasting Activities: “Television Without Frontiers” (TVWF) Directive, Eu-
ropa, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/audiovisual_and_media/l24101_en.htm 
(last updated Sept. 9, 2008). 
129 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 134–35. 
130 See id. at 137; Shao, supra note 15, at 112. 
131 See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 137. 
132 GATT art. IV. Clause (d) of the cinema exception specifies that quotas are “subject 
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133 Id. art. IV; see Shao, supra note 15, at 111. 
134 Wang, supra note 5, at 65. 
135 See Miller, supra note 39; Pierson, supra note 7. 
136 See Qin, supra note 91, at 483, 488–89. 
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and long-time hostility to foreign goods and services prompted negotia-
tions to last for fifteen years.137 The resulting accession package was an 
eleven-page, highly specialized document, compared to the average two-
page, relatively standardized accession protocols of most WTO mem-
bers.138 The trading rights of foreign ventures within China were major 
focal points of the document.139 China committed to according foreign 
individuals and enterprises “treatment no less favorable than that ac-
corded to enterprises in China with respect to the right to trade” within 
three years of accession.140 Paragraph 5.1 of the Accession Protocol dic-
tates that all enterprises in China (including foreign-owned-and-invested 
enterprises) must enjoy the right to import and export all goods 
throughout China, qualified only by China’s right to regulate trade in a 
manner consistent with the general rules of the WTO.141 This obligation 
to grant trading rights to all enterprises is confirmed by paragraphs 
83(d) and 84(a) of the China Accession Working Party Report.142 
2. China’s Retention of Trade Barriers and the U.S. Response 
 Several years after the three-year timetable had expired, China re-
tained regulations undermining the ability of foreign-owned-and-
invested enterprises import and distribute foreign audiovisual works.143 
Consequently, the United States lodged a formal complaint with the 
WTO.144 In part, the complaint alleged that Article 16 of China’s Film 
Enterprise Rule and Article 30 of China’s Film Regulation violated 
China’s obligations under the accession package.145 These provisions 
prohibit all entities from importing films into China for theatrical re-
lease or distribution unless specifically authorized by SARFT.146 No sub-
stantive criteria are set forth to govern the conditions under which au-
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thorization is to be granted, so SARFT retains complete discretion.147 
Only two entities, both of which are state-owned, have been authorized 
to import foreign films.148 Thus, foreign theatrical enterprises in China 
are prevented from fairly competing with the two SARFT-sanctioned, 
state-owned enterprises because they are unable to exhibit the foreign 
films which account for a sizeable portion of Chinese box office reve-
nues.149 The Chinese restrictions also force foreign film producers to 
accept artificially low prices in exchange for the right to exhibit their 
films.150 If they want their films to reach Chinese moviegoers at all, for-
eign producers must currently settle for whatever price the two ap-
proved, state-owned enterprises are willing to pay them.151 
 In August 2009, the WTO Panel found that Article 16 of the Film 
Enterprise Rule and Article 30 of the Film Regulation violate China’s 
obligations under paragraphs 5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol and 
83(d) and 84(a) of the Working Party Report.152 The Panel reasoned 
that SARFT’s discriminatory designation scheme interferes with the 
rights of all private enterprises (including foreign-owned-and-invested 
enterprises) to engage in the trade of foreign films.153 China appealed 
the ruling, and the Appellate Body rendered a decision in December 
2009.154 
 In its appeal, China challenged the Panel’s finding that the con-
tested regulations affect trade in goods.155 China argued that films are 
not goods within the meaning of the WTO framework, and thus, its ac-
cession commitments did not implicate China’s treatment of foreign 
enterprises wishing to import films for theatrical release.156 The Panel 
applied a basic version of the “necessary form of the transaction” test to 
determine that films are a good rather than a service.157 This test dic-
tates that an item’s classification as a good depends upon the form of 
the property in the underlying transaction.158 Though the value of a 
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film comes from the ideas it transmits to the viewer’s mind, that con-
tent is necessarily embodied in a tangible physical form—namely the 
film on which it is printed, or the digital media in which it is embed-
ded.159 Thus, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings that films 
are goods within the meaning of the WTO framework and that the con-
tested regulations violate China’s accession commitments.160 
 China’s appeal also asserted that the contested regulations were 
permissible under the public morals exception found in Article XX(a) 
of GATT, a line of argument that the Panel rejected.161 The public 
morals exception allows contracting parties to restrict the importation 
of foreign goods when such restriction is necessary to protect public 
morality.162 WTO ruling bodies interpret the public morality clause 
strictly and the invoking party bears the burden of proof.163 China ar-
gued that only a state-run entity could be trusted to know which media 
products are compatible with Chinese morality; thus, only a state-run 
entity should be allowed to import foreign films.164 In contrast, the 
Panel found that China had not demonstrated that other enterprises 1) 
would be unable to understand the moral climate, or 2) would be un-
able to hire qualified consultants to advise them on what constitutes 
morally acceptable content in Chinese society.165 Additionally, the gov-
ernment could supervise independent enterprises’ imports to ensure 
that the content of the imported media was compatible with public 
morality.166 
 In evaluating a public morality defense, the Panel weighs the re-
spondent state’s interest in protecting public morality against the in-
ternational community’s interest in free trade.167 Given the heavy bur-
den China’s film regulations impose on private enterprise, coupled 
with the availability of reasonable alternatives that would equally safe-
guard public morality, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding 
that the public morals exception did not legitimize China’s practices in 
this area.168 
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III. Analysis 
 The United States’ aggressive stance against Chinese barriers to 
foreign films stands in contrast to its relative tolerance of parallel Euro-
pean impediments to television programming.169 The rationale for this 
discrepancy may be traced to legal, cultural, economic, and political 
distinctions that differentiate China and Europe and their respective 
treatment of foreign audiovisual works.170 Despite these distinctions, 
the United States has a viable legal argument against European televi-
sion quotas, and American economic interests would be served by pur-
suing a formal WTO judgment against the EU.171 
A. Legal Differences: The EU’s Defenses Under GATT and Possible U.S. 
Responses Informed by China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
 Whereas China’s obligations to liberalize its audiovisual market are 
quite clear under its accession package,172 the EU’s local content re-
quirement for television does not run afoul of any explicit commitments 
to the United States.173 Instead, the United States would have to rely 
upon general GATT provisions like MFN, national treatment, and the 
ban on quantitative restrictions to make its case against Europe.174 On 
their faces, these provisions seem to invalidate the local content re-
quirement, but the EU argues that its treatment of foreign television 
programming is permissible under a few GATT defenses.175 The EU’s 
proposed defenses are, however, undermined by the decision in China—
Measures Affecting Trading Rights.176 Accordingly, the United States 
should use the persuasive force of the Appellate Body Report to for-
mally attack the EU’s treatment of foreign programming before the 
TO
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 In negotiations with the United States over Television Without 
Frontiers, the EU has argued that television programming constitutes a 
service rather than a good, and is thus beyond the purview of GATT.178 
This argument is based on the notion that programs derive their value 
not from the physical medium on which they are stored, but rather 
from the information they transmit to the viewer’s mind.179 China at-
tempted this same line of argument before the Appellate Body in Chi-
na—Measures Affecting Trading Rights, and failed.180 The differentiation 
of goods and services on the basis of whether their real value comes 
from the tangible good or the metaphysical content contained therein 
is referred to as the “real value” test.181 In the past, GATT Panels have 
dismissed the “real value” test when resolving disputes over newspapers, 
books, and magazines, and found that such items qualify as goods, de-
spite the fact that literature’s “real value” comes from the information it 
communicates, not from the physical words printed on the paper.182 
The “necessary form of the transaction” test183 “best comports with the 
standards adopted by the GATT, GATT panels, Community case law, 
and international customs and trade practices.”184 Furthermore, the 
Appellate Body applied a version of the “necessary form of the transac-
tion” test to reject China’s claims that films are services and not 
goods.185 Because the content of foreign films is transported into China 
“via a physical delivery material,”186 such films constitute goods for the 
purposes of WTO agreements.187 Similarly, television programs are 
necessarily transported into Europe via a physical medium upon which 
the informational content is stored.188 Thus, transactions in which TV 
rog
                                                                     
p rams are exchanged are likely to be treated by the WTO as trades 
in goods governed by GATT.189 
                                                 
ruling bodies have devised to 
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 Any EU attempts to justify Television Without Frontiers under the 
public morals clause of GATT would almost certainly fail.190 Measures 
instituted for the protection of state morals are “[s]ubject to the re-
quirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail.”191 In China— 
Measures Affecting Trading Rights, the Appellate Body indicated that the 
public morals exception is to be narrowly construed and requires bal-
ancing the state’s moral interest in the disputed regulation against the 
trading partner’s interest in free trade.192 Where the disputed regula-
tion has little impact upon the state’s preservation of public morals, it 
will not be upheld under this exception.193 Despite the fact that Chi-
nese moral, political, and social norms differ significantly from the 
s.199 Therefore, Ameri-
n 
rality defense would likely fail in this context.201 
                                                                                                                     
American tradition,194 the WTO rejected China’s public morals defense 
because China’s means of restricting the influx of deleterious Western 
influences were not narrowly tailored.195 
 Television Without Frontiers restricts programming only on the 
basis of its origin, not the wholesomeness or authentically European 
nature of its content.196 The public morals exception might be an effec-
tive means of blocking pornographic or excessively violent program-
ming from entering the region, but it cannot be construed so broadly 
as to implicate all foreign programming.197 This is particularly true in 
the context of European rejection of American goods.198 Europe and 
the United States have similar moral underpinnings, rooted in their 
shared democratic and Judeo-Christian tradition
ca programming is unlikely to have a deleterious or even transforma-
tive impact on Europe’s moral climate.200 Accordingly, the public mo-
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 Europe’s cultural similarities to the United States also undermine 
the EU’s ability to invoke the cultural exception which some contract-
ing states (including the EU itself) read into GATT.202 Though this “cul-
ture exception” is not set forth anywhere in the text of GATT, propo-
nents of the cultural exception insist that GATT’s general provisions 
should not apply in the context of cultural goods—those goods that 
play an important role in shaping and promoting national identity.203 
Such goods are said to have intrinsic worth beyond their commercial 
values because they are important vehicles for instilling social norms.204 
Nevertheless, the cultural exception is nonsensical when applied to Eu-
rope as a unit, and especially in relation to the United States.205 It is 
impossible to define one uniform European identity; the EU bounda-
ries circumscribe various contrasting cultural identities.206 This means 
that programming from a non-EU state may be far more reflective of an 
importing European state’s own cultural identity than would pro-
gramming from another European state.207 For example, a TV show 
made in Brazil would likely reflect Portuguese culture better than a 
show made in Finland.208 Similarly, a show made in the United States 
would likely reflect British culture better than a show made in Serbia.209 
Yet, Television Without Frontiers would restrict importation from the 
former, culturally similar non-European states, but not from the latter, 
ltu
can essentially slap a “made in Europe” sticker on works that are decid-
                                                                                                                     
cu rally distinct European states.210 National and community bounda-
ries are not useful proxies for culture in this context.211 
 Additionally, rather than using the regulation to foster authentic 
European talent, European film executives may be using the local con-
tent requirement to entice American talent to work and film in Eu-
rope.212 By providing financing and personnel, European executives 
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edly American, thereby circumventing the local content require-
ment.213 This trend indicates that “some of the Directive’s supporters 
are less interested in preserving national identity than in transferring 
pieces of the entertainment business from Hollywood to Paris.”214 The 
Appellate Body Report in China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights sug-
gests that, when a nation deviates from general GATT principles in or-
der to protect its cultural well-being, the deviation will only be consid-
ered legitimate if it is reasonably tailored toward the professed social 
goal.215 Given that there is no uniform European artistic identity and 
that the European film industry is not making good-faith efforts to es-
tablish one, it would be difficult for the EU to defend Television With-
out Frontiers under its proposed culture exception.216 
B. Cultural ropean and 
peans enjoy liberal ac-
cess to foreign media through other sources.220 
                                                                                                                     
 Differences: Human Rights Implications of the Eu
Chinese Treatment of Foreign Audiovisual Works 
 The EU undoubtedly defends what is primarily an economic, pro-
tectionist practice through untenable rhetoric about preserving Euro-
pean culture and (somewhat more convincingly) preventing “mental 
colonization” via American programming.217 Were the promotion of 
cultural self-determination and pluralism (the individual’s right to ac-
cess information from a number of diverse sources) truly the motivat-
ing forces behind Television Without Frontiers, the local content re-
quirement would be justifiable from a human rights standpoint.218 
Given its scope, however, Television Without Frontiers actually has 
some negative human rights implications because it impedes—to a lim-
ited extent—the free flow of information and interferes with individual 
freedom of choice and consumer preference.219 Still, given that forty-
nine percent of EU airtime may still be filled by foreign programming, 
there is little serious risk that non-European influences will be halted at 
the community borders, particularly since Euro
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 China, on the other hand, uses its tight controls over the influx of 
foreign media to preserve the Chinese identity to the exclusion of all 
others.221 The Chinese administration fears that foreign influences in 
the form of film and television could ultimately eviscerate socialist ide-
ology and prompt a popular uprising against the government.222 Chi-
na’s barriers to foreign audiovisual works serve as instruments of politi-
cal control to prevent this possibility.223 Foreign websites, publications, 
and television programming are similarly restricted, meaning that the 
lack of access to Western media extends far beyond China’s movie thea-
ters.224 Consequently, in its WTO dispute against China, the United 
States had the moral high ground in a way that it might not were it to 
oppose the EU.225 Despite the very different political and cultural rea-
sons for its own protectionist policies, the EU’s underhanded attempts 
to shirk its free trade obligations and illegitimately favor European tele-
vision enterprises warrant third-party intervention.226 
C. Economic Differences: U.S. Competition with Europe and China in the 
Audiovisual Sector and Beyond 
 The United States’ decision to attack China’s treatment of foreign 
audiovisual works before the WTO may be traceable to U.S. trepidation 
about China’s rising economy.227 U.S. policymakers fear that China 
poses a large threat economically and may soon overtake the United 
States’ position as the world’s leader in trade.228 Thus, the debate over 
China’s treatment of foreign films may just be a data point in a larger 
scheme to break down China’s trade barriers and ensure that China is 
not benefitting from WTO membership without incurring its fair share 
of obligations.229 
 The conflict between China and the United States extends beyond 
just trade policy—economic tensions are part of a larger ideological 
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battle between the Eastern and Western ways of life.230 What is in con-
flict is the proper way of running a country and its markets.231 Chinese 
domination of the global economy would arguably undermine the le-
gitimacy of capitalism and democracy.232 This concern is exacerbated 
by the fact that China is using its newly accumulated wealth to build up 
its military, a step toward exerting more control over global politics.233 
 Though Europe dominated the global economy for centuries, Eu-
ropean economic strength is not perceived as a threat to the American 
social order in the way that Chinese economic strength is.234 Further-
more, the European economy has been weak over the past several years 
as a result of its sovereign debt crisis, as well as fallout from the sub-
prime mortgage crisis.235 Because the EU is not viewed as posing a seri-
ous economic threat to the United States, the United States has less in-
centive to challenge specific European trade barriers before the 
WTO.236 
 Despite the fact that the current European economy overall may 
not pose a major threat to the U.S. economy, several European states do 
have sophisticated film and television industries that could eventually 
challenge Hollywood’s dominance in the global television industry.237 
Television Without Frontiers effectively subsidizes production capabili-
ties in such states to the detriment of American film production.238 Eu-
ropean states with unsophisticated production capabilities are not likely 
to build up their film industries in response to fulfill the local content 
requirement imposed on them by Television Without Frontiers.239 In-
stead, they will likely elect to purchase programming from other Euro-
pean states with already-developed production capabilities when, absent 
the Directive, they would have purchased American programming.240 In 
purchasing these European programs as required, they will often incur 
higher costs for lower-quality programming than that which they would 
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receive from the United States.241 It is exactly this sort of inefficient allo-
cation of resources that GATT and other free trade agreements were 
drafted to prevent.242 Thus it behooves the United States (and the in-
ternational community as a whole) to force the EU to comply with 
GATT provisions in the television market.243 
 U.S. policymakers also may have chosen to attack China’s barriers 
to foreign films because such barriers are believed to prompt massive 
piracy of U.S. films throughout China, costing the U.S. film industry 
billions of dollars within China and abroad.244 The Motion Picture As-
sociation of America reasons that the marginal availability of American 
films within China causes Chinese citizens to use illegal means to view 
the films from which they are barred legitimate access.245 If piracy 
served as a significant impetus to challenge China’s actions before the 
WTO, the United States should also challenge Television Without Fron-
tiers, for piracy of American programming is rampant throughout Eu-
rope.246 In 2009, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and 
Germany occupied six of the top ten spots in a ranking of the highest 
consumers of pirated American television programming.247 While such 
piracy has declined in the United States in the past few years, levels re-
main high in Europe.248 Data suggests that “availability is the key when 
combating piracy,”249 so the decreased availability of U.S. programming 
under Television Without Frontiers presumably contributes to wide-
spread piracy of U.S. programming throughout Europe.250 It is worth 
noting that France, the fifth-highest consumer of pirated U.S. pro-
gramming, imposes an even stricter local content requirement on its 
television stations than that imposed by Television Without Frontiers.251 
France requires that forty percent of French airtime be occupied by 
French programming, and that the remaining sixty percent to be occu-
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pied by European programming, allotting no space for any non-
European productions.252 Additionally, “European works” are defined 
more strictly under France’s European works quota than under Televi-
sion Without Frontiers.253 French viewers’ meager access to U.S. pro-
gramming through French broadcasters may help explain why France 
is the second-highest non-English-speaking consumer of pirated Amer-
ican television.254 
D. Political Differences: Europe’s Comparative Strength Within the WTO 
 In addition to economic considerations, the United States’ deci-
sion to attack China’s barriers to foreign films might have been influ-
enced by China’s relative vulnerability within the WTO.255 Although 
China was a founding member of GATT, it withdrew just two years after 
the organization’s inception.256 China later attempted to rejoin GATT, 
but its membership was not reinstated until China acceded to the WTO 
in 2001.257 China’s accession to the WTO was unusually long and diffi-
cult due to the fact that the highly protectionist, state-run Chinese eco-
nomic system was (and to a large extent, still is) incompatible with the 
spirit of the WTO and the free trade agreements that it encompasses.258 
Since joining the WTO, China’s progress in meeting its accession obli-
gations has been slow, placing it in contention with other WTO mem-
bers and making it an easy U.S. target for a WTO complaint.259 Twelve 
years after acceding to the WTO, China’s deep-seated hostility toward 
free trade is still evident.260 
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 In contrast to China, the EU, a founding member of the WTO,261 
has a long-standing reputation for promoting free trade.262 European 
states comprised seven of the twenty-three original GATT signatories, 
and the European Economic Community became a full GATT partici-
pant in 1960.263 
 Additionally, the EU is comprised of twenty-seven member states, 
all of which are also independent members of WTO.264 These states 
represent a wide range of cultural and economic interests, so the EU is 
perceived as more powerful and important within the WTO than a sin-
gle state actor.265 Accordingly, restrictive EU-wide regulations look 
more credible and less unilateral than restrictive Chinese regula-
tions.266 These factors would presumably make obtaining an adverse 
WTO ruling against the EU more difficult than against China.267 
                                                                                                                     
 Nevertheless, disputes between the United States and the European 
community at large (transatlantic disputes) under the WTO/GATT 
framework have been numerous and have yielded significant successes 
in the past.268 Between 1960 and 2001, eighty-five distinct transatlantic 
disputes were filed.269 Forty-nine percent of these disputes ended in sub-
stantial concessions and twenty percent in partial concessions from the 
respondent.270 Data also reveals that a pro-complainant bias exists within 
the WTO; Panels have found for the complainant in a sizeable majority 
of all GATT cases.271 
 Negotiations between the United States and the EU have consis-
tently failed to result in any progress toward increased liberalization of 
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the European television market.272 Accordingly, the United States 
should not shy away from seeking a formal WTO judgment invalidating 
Television Without Frontiers.273 Such a decision would legitimize the 
U.S. position on Television Without Frontiers and pressure the EU to 
comply in order to protect its trade reputation and avoid potential re-
taliation.274 If the EU failed to comply with a WTO order to liberalize 
its television market, the United States would then be entitled to im-
plement reciprocal sanctions to compensate for the adverse effects suf-
fered by the American audiovisual industry under the Directive.275 
Conclusion 
 Foreign barriers to audiovisual trade, like those posed by Television 
Without Frontiers and China’s current film distribution framework, 
threaten the continued success of Hollywood. Hollywood relies heavily 
upon foreign markets to recoup its production costs, so asymmetrical 
barriers to the sale of American films abroad cut into the United States’ 
overall economic success and threaten to improperly propel foreign 
film competitors ahead of their American counterparts. In addition, 
such barriers contribute to massive and widespread piracy of American 
films and TV that further undermines Hollywood’s viability. 
 Foreign barriers to audiovisual trade harm more than just the U.S. 
economy. They also create an inefficient distribution of resources 
throughout the global community and interfere with individual con-
sumer choice and free access to information. In China, barriers to U.S. 
audiovisual products isolate citizens from Western ideas. In the EU, 
barriers to American products force television stations to purchase Eu-
ropean programming to the exclusion of American programming, 
sometimes paying more money for an inferior or less-desirable product. 
 The United States sought and obtained a WTO judgment against 
China in China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights, ostensibly forcing 
China to liberalize its audiovisual sector. The EU’s Television Without 
Frontiers Directive, on the other hand, remains in full force after more 
than twenty years, and the United States has never pursued the Direc-
tive further than the bilateral consultation stage of WTO dispute set-
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tlement. Consultations with the EU resulted in a standstill and were 
eventually abandoned. 
 Given the lack of success that the United States has experienced in 
negotiating with the EU over its television restrictions, the United 
States should revive its dormant WTO complaint against the EU, and 
this time follow the complaint through to the decision stage. Though a 
powerful player within the WTO, the EU is not immune from an ad-
verse ruling where its transgressions against the global free market 
cannot be justified under the GATT framework. The decision in Chi-
na—Measures Affecting Trading Rights indicates that a WTO Panel would 
most likely rule in favor of the United States and find that Television 
Without Frontiers’ local content requirement violates GATT. Such a 
decision would pressure the EU to abolish the local content require-
ment and may encourage EU member states to repeal some of their 
own local content requirements, or revise them so that they are more 
narrowly tailored toward legitimate objectives like the protection of lo-
cal culture. 
 Ultimately, if the United States wishes to ensure that Hollywood 
continues to be adequately rewarded abroad for creating superior 
products, it must take a uniformly aggressive stance against foreign 
trade barriers, particularly when such barriers are no more than pro-
tectionist policies masquerading as something more legitimate. 
